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Abstract 
The 2011 Japanese earthquake and tsunami and the consequent accident at the Fukushima 
nuclear power plant have had consequences far beyond Japan itself. This paper examines 
reactions to the accident in three major economies: Japan, the UK and Germany. Each had 
been committed to relatively ambitious climate change targets prior to the accident. In Japan 
and Germany, the accident has precipitated a major change of policy direction. In the UK, 
debate has been muted and there has been essentially no change in energy or climate 
change policies. For each country, the status of energy and climate change policies prior to 
the accident is assessed, responses to the accident are described and the possible impact 
on the country’s position in international climate negotiations is analysed. In the final section 
of the paper, the countries’ responses are compared and contrasted, reasons for the 
different policy responses are suggested and some themes, common across all countries, 
are identified. 
 
Policy Abstract 
The attraction of nuclear power has rested on the promise of low cost electricity, low-carbon 
energy supply and enhanced energy independence. The Fukushima accident which followed 
the Japanese tsunami of March 2011 has prompted a critical re-appraisal of nuclear power. 
This paper assesses the responses to Fukushima in three countries: the UK, Germany and 
Japan itself. All three countries had foreseen nuclear as playing a significant part in climate 
mitigation strategies prior to the accident. The UK government has continued to support 
nuclear new build following a prompt review of safety arrangements. Japan and Germany 
have decided to phase out nuclear power, albeit on different timescales. The paper 
systematically assesses the factors that explain the different decisions including patterns of 
energy demand and supply, the wider political context, institutional arrangements and public 
attitudes to risk. The implications for international climate negotiations are assessed. 
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Introduction	  	  
Prior to the Fukushima accident, Japan, Germany and the UK were committed to relatively 
ambitious greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction targets. All three governments 
considered nuclear energy to have a role to play in providing low carbon electricity. Japan 
wanted to boost nuclear generation to 50 or 60% of all electricity by 2030 under its Basic 
Energy Plan (METI,  2010). The UK government was committed to a programme of nuclear 
new build, the last nuclear plant having been commissioned in 1995. Five months before the 
accident, the German government had reversed a long standing decision on nuclear phase 
out and had added 196 years to the remaining 67 operating years allowed at the 17 
commercial German nuclear power plants (NPPs). This decision was taken in the context of 
a long term low carbon roadmap (Rossnagel and Hentschel 2010, Jahn, Korolczuck, 2012, 
160ff).  
The magnitude 9.0 earthquake that devastated the eastern coast of Honshu caused a 
station blackout at the Daiichi/Fukushima NPP and triggered a huge tsunami leading to a 
major nuclear accident. In the following weeks, parts of Japan were affected by nuclear 
fallout (measured in terms of caesium-137) that amounted to about one third of that released 
after the 1986 Chernobyl accident (Stohl et al, 2011). Concerns about wider nuclear safety 
and severe common mode failure led to the shutdown of other NPPs resulting in severe 
shortages of power supply capacity in Japan. 
In response to the accident, the UK commissioned a review of the implications of the 
Fukushima accident for existing and new reactors. The review interpreted the accident as 
being the result of a singular event extremely unlikely to occur in Northern Europe, combined 
with inadequate safety specifications. The UK consequently decided to continue with nuclear 
new build while making relatively minor modifications to regulatory arrangements. However, 
Germany interpreted the accident as the writing on the wall for nuclear, reversed the 
decision to extend the lives of its nuclear reactors and accelerated a nuclear phase out, 
immediately closing down eight of its 17 operating reactors. In the short term, Japan was 
forced to safeguard electricity supplies with significantly reduced nuclear output and started 
a fundamental review of policy on electricity generation. In September 2012, Japan followed 
Germany by planning a nuclear phase-out, though on a longer time timescale with all NPPs 
due to close in the 2030s. 
In this paper, views on the impact of Fukushima on climate and energy policies in the three 
countries are presented with the aims of explaining the differences in response and 
understanding better how governments plan to shape their energy systems to achieve low 
carbon electricity supply.  
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To underpin the explanation of the differences, we assess each country individually, 
focusing on four areas: a) the structure of energy demand and supply; b) energy and climate 
policies and the wider political context; c) institutional arrangements and economic and 
environmental regulation of the energy sector; and d) public attitudes to risk, especially 
those relating to nuclear, and the role of NGOs.  Some tentative conclusions about the 
implications for the country’s position in the international arena are then drawn. In the final 
section responses in the three countries are compared and contrasted with a view to 
enabling mutual learning for a sustainable low carbon future. 
Underlying comparisons: energy markets and risk 
perception 
The situation regarding patterns of energy supply and demand in the three countries, and 
drivers of risk perception, are first examined. Figure 1 shows that Japan has the highest 
absolute level of energy consumption, but in 2009 met less than 20% of its energy needs 
through domestic supply. Almost all of this was in the form of nuclear power supplemented 
by small amounts of bioenergy. The UK, with the smallest level of consumption, was at the 
opposite end of the spectrum. It met 80% of its needs through domestic supply though 
nuclear accounted for only 11% of that. The UK still produces considerable quantities of oil 
and gas in the North Sea, but production is declining and the UK’s degree of self-sufficiency 
is projected to fall (DECC, 2010). As the UK is highly dependent on natural gas for electricity 
generation (40% in 2011, DECC (2012)), the security of supply question is more acute than 
Figure 1 suggests. Germany has an intermediate position, meeting 40% of its energy needs 
from domestic supply, with nuclear accounting for 12% of total needs in 2009. Germany 
depends almost entirely on imports of oil and natural gas and now imports almost 40% of its 
coal. 
The contrasts are striking. Viewing this through a security of supply lens, Japan appears to 
have the greatest “need” for nuclear power while at the other end of the spectrum the UK 
has less nuclear dependence and less objective need for it. Yet, the UK is the only country 
of the three with an unambiguous public policy commitment to nuclear new build.  
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Figure 1: Primary Energy Demand and Domestic Production 2009
 
Note: % electricity from nuclear in 2009: Japan (30%); UK (21%); Germany (27%)  
Source: based on International Energy Agency, 2012 
 
Although there is a substantial literature relevant to risk perceptions of nuclear power in and 
across countries, no study has systematically addressed differences between Japan, 
Germany and the UK. Country-specific insights from the literature are referred to in the 
following sections. However, robust generic conclusions have been reached about attitudes 
to the risks associated with nuclear power. It has been established that “opposition to 
nuclear energy stems from concerns which go beyond technologies to the social and 
political institutions they imply. These concerns include the centralisation of scarce and vital 
resources (such as energy), their control by ever-larger and impersonal bureaucracies, and 
the growing dependence on the specialised knowledge of technocratic elites..... further, it is 
related technically and psychologically to nuclear weapons” (Otway et al., 1978). Therefore, 
the nature of the institutions that control nuclear power and historical associations with 
nuclear weapons are relevant to the cross-country comparison.  
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Energy	  and	  Climate	  Policy	  in	  Japan	  after	  the	  Fukushima	  Nuclear	  
Accident	  
Patterns	  of	  energy	  supply	  and	  demand	  in	  Japan	  	  
Japan is dependent on imports for more than 80% of its energy needs. Nuclear power has 
accounted for almost all of Japan’s indigenous energy production and has, so far, 
represented the only means of mitigating import dependence. Prior to the Fukushima 
accident on 11 March 2011, nuclear accounted for around 30% of Japan’s electricity 
production.	 According to the Basic Plan for Energy agreed by the Cabinet in June 2010 
(METI, 2010), nine new nuclear power units were planned to be built by 2020.  
The Fukushima accident placed Japan in an acute dilemma, with anxiety about the risks 
associated with nuclear balanced against the contribution it makes to the energy mix and the 
need to purchase alternative sources of energy, mainly natural gas and coal, in international 
markets. 
Japanese	  energy	  and	  climate	  policy	  
Pre-Fukushima, the promotion of nuclear power had a relatively-high priority in energy 
policy. By comparison, decentralised renewable energy and energy conservation had a 
much lower priority. For example, the government started to promote renewable energy in 
2003 through a Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) with the utility companies being 
required to meet very limited purchase quotas. Even if the utility companies were to fulfil 
their obligations under this RPS, renewable energy would have accounted for only 1.35% of 
total electricity consumption by 2012 (METI 2006).  
There are three main reasons for this: 1) the government was confident in nuclear power 
and the strength of Japanese technology, seeing it as a potential export opportunity (ten 
Hoedt, 2012); 2) the government had focused mainly on the cost of power production 
without considering wider risks; and 3) power companies have criticised the modifications to 
existing power grids needed to support decentralised renewable energy as being costly and 
destabilising to the system. 
Although it is neither a formally declared nor a publicly-debated policy, it has also been 
speculated that one of the reasons for the promotion of the nuclear power generation is to 
maintain the capacity to have a nuclear deterrent force. In December 2011, Ishiba Shigeru, a 
former Defence Minister, stirred a public debate by openly mentioning the issue (Wall Street 
Journal 2011).  
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Under these circumstances, there had been little pressure on policy makers to promote 
renewable energy widely until the Fukushima accident. 
Institutional	  Arrangements	  
In Japan, utilities such as Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) are vertically integrated 
regional monopolies.  The utilities have had little incentive to promote conservation because 
profits are coupled to the level of electricity sales. A voluntary plan to control GHG emissions 
dating from 1997 is intensity-based and not based on absolute amounts, providing little 
incentive to utilities (Price 2005).  Furthermore, under the current Japanese emission 
accounting system, electricity-related emissions are attributed to the electricity consumer 
rather than electricity producers. Safety regulation and the management of NPPs have been 
in the hands of the Ministry for the Economy and Trade (METI) which also promotes nuclear 
energy. There has therefore been a conflict of interest in terms of safety regulation.   
Following the Fukushima accident, the question of checks and balances in respect of safety 
regulation within  government and the power sector has been addressed. On 19 September 
2012, the nuclear safety regulatory divisions of the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency 
was separated from METI and established as a strengthened external agency of the Ministry 
of the Environment. At the same time, the unbundling of the electricity generation and 
electricity transmission is being intensively discussed. This would induce a revolutionary 
change in the existing monopolised electricity system. 
In terms of climate policy, a carbon tax was introduced on 1 October 2012.  However, this is 
set at a relatively low rate (approximately $3/tCO2) and will be insufficient to induce sharp 
GHG emission reductions.  
Attitudes	  to	  nuclear	  power	  
Before the Fukushima accident, the Conventional Basic Energy Plan had been developed by 
industry and energy experts belonging to the Advisory Committee for Natural Resources and 
Energy under the METI (METI, 2010).   
However, after the Fukushima accident, a “national debate” has taken place in Japan. For 
the first time, public participation in the decision-making process has been attempted by 
providing “options“ to the public.  As part of the national debate process, scientific reviews 
and information were also provided to the public. Reviews of electricity costs (nuclear and 
renewables) and the costs of nuclear waste disposal (direct disposal/fast reactor) were 
made by the government and the discussion was summarised by Atomic Energy 
Commission and Central Environment Council (Energy and Environment Council, 2012a). 
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The Cabinet Office Secretariat and the Energy and Environment Council (chaired by the 
Minister in charge of national strategy) have played a big role in the decision making 
process. They have generated the options presented to the public and have assessed the 
advantages and disadvantages of each.  
On 29 June 2012, the Energy and Environment Council announced three options for a new 
energy policy to replace the 2010 goal of expanding nuclear power's share of national 
electricity generation from 30% to 50% by 2030. The options were: to eliminate nuclear 
power altogether; to reduce dependence to 15% by 2030; or to reduce dependence to 20-
25%. 
On 22 August 2012, a government opinion poll on Japan's future energy policy showed that 
nearly 50% of respondents wanted to end Japan's nuclear power generation by 2030, a far 
larger portion than those supporting more gradual reductions in nuclear power (Mainichi 
News, 2012). “Deliberative polling”, a new and constructive way of researching public 
opinion, was also tried for the first time in Japanese policy making. A random, representative 
sample of the population was first polled on the issues at stake. After this baseline poll, 
selected members of the sample were invited to gather at a single place for a weekend in 
order to discuss the issues in depth. The outcome of the deliberative polling showed that the 
more information participants acquired about energy issues, the greater their support for 
reducing Japan's nuclear reliance to zero by 2030 (Bloomberg Businessweek, 2012).  
Following the national debate, the Cabinet Office concluded that “at least, more than half 
support less nuclear dependent society”.  On 14 September 2012, the Energy and 
Environment Council officially announced a new Innovative Energy/Environmental Strategy 
which set out the following governmental decisions (Energy and Environment Council, 
2012a): 
1. A less nuclear dependent society (aiming at zero nuclear in the 2030s): Phase out of all 
plants after a 40 years life-time, no new construction, the re-start of existing plants only 
after strict safety checks, and a pending decision on high-level radioactive nuclear waste.  
2. A green energy revolution: Promotion of energy saving (10% and 19% reductions in 
electricity and energy consumption respectively), renewable energy to increase by a 
factor of eight by 2030 compared to 2010 to reach 30% of electricity production.  
3. Secure and stable energy supply: Utilisation of coal for base-load electricity, plus the 
promotion of gas fired generation. 
4. Reform of the electricity system: unbundling electricity generation and transmission.  
5. GHG reductions of 5- 9% by 2020 from 1990 levels, and around 20% by 2030.   
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The future of these policies is not certain as it is possible that the current Democratic Party 
administration could be replaced by the opposition party after the next election. Importantly, 
the Innovative Energy/Environmental Strategy was not approved as a full Cabinet decision, 
which weakens its force. However, as a result of the current strong public sentiment against 
nuclear power, it would be extremely difficult to build new plant in the near future under any 
administration. 
What	  difference	  has	  Fukushima	  made?	  
Five big changes have happened in Japan since the Fukushima-accident. 
First, a consensus has been reached on the need for structural change in the energy sector 
leading towards a less nuclear-dependent society. On 1 November 2012, despite only two 
nuclear power generation units being in operation in Japan,  there is no severe shortage of 
power supply. It would be very difficult to build new nuclear power plant in the near future. 
Second, promotion of decentralised energy is progressing. A more progressive scheme for 
supporting decentralised energy was proposed by both policy makers and NGOs.  The bill 
enabling the introduction of feed-in tariffs (FITs) successfully passed Congress on 26 August 
2011. Under the FiT, solar power with a capacity more than 10kW receives a tariff of 50 US 
cents/kWh and wind turbines with a capacity more than 20kW receive a tariff of 25 US 
cents/kWh. These are relatively generous in international terms and are aimed at boosting 
investment in renewable energy. 
Third, the system for regulating the safety of NPPs has changed.  Due to strong criticism 
about conflicts of interests, the nuclear safety regulatory divisions of the Nuclear and 
Industrial Safety Agency were separated from METI and established as a strengthened 
external agency of the Ministry of the Environment.  This will allow the new agency to 
develop a more independent and objective attitude towards nuclear power plant safety 
management. 
Fourth, structural changes to the way in which the electricity grid is managed are anticipated.  
In the past, proposals to liberalise markets and restructure the management of the grid have 
been strongly objected to by the utility companies. However, some degree of unbundling of 
the electricity generation and electricity transmission will be unavoidable, and will have a 
large impact on the existing monopoly electricity suppliers.   
Fifth, a large amount of energy conservation has been achieved. This has resulted from both 
stringent government policies and voluntary action. For example, electricity consumption in 
the Tokyo metropolitan area was reduced by 16% in July and August 2011 compared to the 
same months in the previous year (Yomiuri Shimbun, 2011). In the summer of 2012, almost 
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same amount (15.6 %) of saving compared to the summer of 2010 was achieved in Tokyo 
(Energy and Environmental Council, 2012b).  Industry reduced electricity demand and 
shifted the demand peak. Most manufacturing facilities conserved energy by lowering 
lighting levels and restricting the use of air conditioning. The car industry shifted operations 
from weekdays to the weekend.  However, there is less certainty about the longer-term 
persistence of these actions without the introduction of appropriate incentives. 
Japan’s	  response	  in	  the	  international	  arena	  
In the context of the need for the radical reform of energy policy, the Innovative 
Energy/Environmental Strategy has been influenced to some degree by the argument that 
coal-fired power should be expanded to replace nuclear power and that Japan should 
reconsider its international commitments to GHG emissions reductions. 
In 2008, domestic GHG emissions were 1.6% higher than in the Kyoto Protocol baseline 
year of 1990. However, this has been offset by a 5.1% decrease achieved through forestry 
and foreign credits purchased by the Government. In order to reach the 6% reduction 
required under the Kyoto Protocol target, another 2.5% decrease is therefore required. 
However, even if the economic recovery causes emissions to increase, and even if nuclear 
power plants do not operate, the situation does not require an immediate declaration of non-
compliance with the Kyoto Protocol as long as the present level of energy conservation 
continues and foreign credits obtained by the industrial sector are taken into account.  
Following Fukushima, the 25% reduction target for 2020 promoted by former Prime Minister 
Hatoyama presents more difficulties.  It is clear that the Government now wants to avoid 
stringent international commitments due to uncertainty about the energy mix and prospects 
for energy conservation. In addition, following Fukushima, the Japanese people appear to 
have become more inward-looking and less sensitive to global issues such as climate 
change.  Climate scepticism has grown and has influenced both policymakers and the 
general public to some degree. 
The current Innovative Energy/Environmental Strategy, stipulates a 5-9% reduction in 
domestic GHG emissions by 2020 from the 1990 base year. The Japanese government 
faces challenges in both setting a GHG emission target which include international credit 
trading and forest sinks and in presenting its commitment to the wider world. 
In conclusion, a very ambitious Japanese emissions reduction target cannot be expected, at 
least in the short time. The Fukushima accident has lowered the political priority attached to 
climate change mitigation.  However, in the long term, fundamental institutional changes 
made following the Fukushima accident could help facilitate climate change mitigation action 
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through the promotion of renewable energy and energy conservation.  The political power of 
the incumbent utility companies has also decreased which will change the dynamics of the 
energy/climate policy making process.  
The	  UK	  post-­‐Fukushima:	  the	  dog	  that	  did	  not	  bark	  
Patterns	  of	  energy	  supply	  and	  demand	  in	  the	  UK	  	  
The UK’s trade balance in energy is changing rapidly and is driving a new debate about 
energy security. The UK became a net importer of gas in 2004 and a net importer of crude 
oil in 2006 (DECC, 2012). Dependence on gas imports has led to perceptions of vulnerability 
that have raised the political profile of the energy security issue (Wicks, 2009). This has 
been exacerbated by a perceived risk of the “lights going out” due to a capacity pinch in the 
electricity sector around 2015. This is due to older nuclear plants closing and some coal 
stations shutting down under the requirements of the EU Large Combustion Plant Directive. 
New nuclear is perceived as part of the policy response to the UK’s changing energy 
balance.  
UK	  energy	  and	  climate	  policy	  
The UK’s energy and climate policy rests on three foundations: environmental concerns, 
notably climate change; energy security; and “affordability”. Under the Climate Change Act 
(CCA) 2008, the UK is legally committed to reducing GHG emissions by 80% by 2050. In 
addition, three consecutive legally binding five-year budgets must be in place at any one 
time. The 3rd carbon budget for 2018-2022 requires a 34% reduction in GHG emissions 
relative to 1990. In 2011, a 4th carbon budget, which would see emissions falling by 50% by 
2023-27, was legislated.  
The Government believes that a radical decarbonisation of the electricity sector is needed to 
meet climate policy goals (DECC, 2011a). The Committee on Climate Change envisages the 
carbon intensity of electricity generation falling from today’s level of around 500g CO2/kWh 
to under 300 g/kWh by 2020 and below 100 g/kWh by 2030 (Committee on Climate Change, 
2011). Gas-fired generation, unless associated with carbon capture and storage (CCS), can 
have little role by 2030 under this scenario. However, a debate about the role of natural gas 
in the electricity mix has been developing. The Government has proposed that gas plants 
without CCS can be allowed to operate until 2045. It is argued by others that this 
undermines the 2030 electric decarbonisation objective (HC Energy and Climate Change 
Committee, 2012). 
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The UK is pursuing all possible low carbon electricity generation options. There are plans to 
demonstrate CCS at scale at four sites. Renewable electricity is being promoted, prompted 
by the requirements of the EU Renewable Energy Directive which requires the UK to source 
15% of final energy demand from renewables by 2020. The UK is planning for renewables to 
meet 30% of electricity generation needs by 2020 (DECC, 2011b). The main renewable 
energy technologies will be onshore wind, offshore wind and biomass power.  
Nuclear new build is being actively promoted with three consortia having expressed 
ambitions to build 16 GW of new plant. The original plan was that the first plant would come 
on line in late 2017 but the timetable has slipped and neither the Government nor the 
developers now refer to target dates. This government and the previous one have stated 
that there will be no public subsidy for nuclear and work commissioned by government 
appears to show that nuclear is the cheapest of the low carbon options (Mott McDonald, 
2011). However, it has been argued that actual costs, allowing for the risk of failing to build 
to time and cost, are higher and that public support would be necessary (Reuters, 2012). 
The UK no longer has the domestic capability to design and build nuclear stations. Although 
three consortia have been developing plans for new build, business support has been 
eroding. In September 2011, Scottish and Southern Energy withdrew from NuGen, a joint 
venture between themselves, GDF Suez and Iberdrola, saying that “its resources are better 
deployed on business activities and technologies where it has the greatest knowledge and 
experience”. The German companies RWE and E.ON, both dealing with a nuclear phase-out 
in their home territory, withdrew from the Horizon Nuclear Power consortium in March 2012. 
Their share was bought by the Japanese company, Hitachi, in October 2012. Blocked 
nuclear ambitions in both Germany and Japan have thus affected the UK electricity sector. 
The international consequences of the German Energiewende are further demonstrated by 
the withdrawal of Siemens from the nuclear business in 2011.  
The French EDF/Centrica consortium which plans to build the first of the new reactors has 
retained its public commitment to new build. However, Centrica has publicly voiced concerns 
about the “business case”. EDF has indicated that it retains “confidence in our collective 
ability” (that of business and Government)  to deliver nuclear new build but, in evidence to a 
Parliamentary Inquiry, has expressed concern about some aspects of the proposed reform 
of electricity markets (see below) needed to provide investor confidence.   
There has been policy continuity in the UK with both the current Coalition Government and 
the previous Government actively promoting nuclear power. But the junior partners in the 
current Coalition, the Liberal Democrats, went into the last election opposed to nuclear. 
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However, the Liberal Democrats have supported the Coalition Agreement on nuclear post-
Fukushima. 
Institutional	  Arrangements	  
The Government has taken a number of steps to facilitate nuclear new build. Changes to the 
spatial planning system and a new system of National Policy Statements mean that generic 
policy issues, such as the relative merits of nuclear or renewables, will no longer be within 
the scope of local planning inquiries. An Office for Nuclear Development (OND) has been 
established within the Department of Energy and Climate Change and a stream-lined 
Generic Design Assessment (GDA) process for new reactor types has been introduced 
(DECC, 2011c). The Westinghouse AP1000 reactor and the Areva European Pressurised 
Water Reactor (EPR) have now received interim design acceptance confirmation under the 
GDA process.  
However, the biggest change relates to the design of electricity markets. Low carbon 
generation is capital intensive and is exposed to high levels of risk in volatile wholesale 
electricity markets. Under Electricity Market Reform (EMR), long-term contracts for low 
carbon generation will be introduced (DECC, 2011d). The current Renewables Obligation 
will be superseded by a system of “feed-in tariffs (FiTs) through contracts for differences 
(CfDs)”. All low carbon generation, including nuclear, will continue to participate in the 
wholesale electricity market, but will be paid the difference between a contracted strike price 
and a reference price in the wholesale market. 
A draft Energy Bill aimed at implementing EMR was heavily criticised by a Parliamentary 
Committee during pre-legislative scrutiny (HC Energy and Climate Change Committee, 
2012). Among the key issues were the lack of a tangible counter-party for the CfDs, which 
most witnesses construed as a reversal of Government policy, and compatibility with EU 
state aid rules if nuclear were to receive a subsidy. 
As part of EMR, a “carbon price floor” has been legislated to counteract low and volatile 
carbon prices in the EU ETS. The Government plans to set a target carbon price, rising to 
£20/tonne CO2 by 2020 and £70/tonne by 2030. Fuels for electricity generation will be taxed 
according to the difference between the target price and forward EU ETS prices. This will 
benefit both existing and new nuclear plant.  
Nuclear safety is currently regulated by an Office of Nuclear Regulation headed by the Chief 
Inspector of Nuclear Installations. For historic reasons, ONR is currently part of the Health 
and Safety Executive, an independent regulator responsible for workplace health and safety. 
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It is sponsored by the Department of Work and Pensions. The Government plans to 
establish ONR as a separate statutory body.  
The Government was prompt in commissioning a report by the Chief Inspector of Nuclear 
Installations (the “Weightman Review”) on the implications of Fukushima for the UK (HM 
Chief Inspector of Nuclear Installations, 2011). This was not a fundamental review of nuclear 
and its place in the UK energy mix, but a narrower technical review of UK nuclear safety 
arrangements. It concluded that there was “no reason for curtailing the operation of nuclear 
power plants or other nuclear facilities in the UK”.  
The review argued that the UK’s nuclear regulator operates independently of industry and 
government, and that the institutional weakness now being addressed by the Japanese 
government is not present in the UK. It noted that the Japanese earthquake/ tsunami were 
“far beyond the most extreme natural events that the UK would be expected to experience”. 
The review recommended improving safety arrangements, such as ensuring that “safety 
cases for new sites for multiple reactors adequately demonstrate the capability for dealing 
with multiple serious concurrent events induced by extreme off-site hazards”. The 
recommendations were essentially incremental. There was little public debate about the 
Weightman report although it was claimed by some NGOs that it was “a rushed report.... 
designed with one objective - to give the green light to a new generation of nuclear power 
stations, irrespective of the safety, environmental or rising financial costs” (Greenpeace, 
2011). 
Attitudes to nuclear power 
Public attitudes have been studied systematically since the Government started to promote 
nuclear in the mid-2000s (Pidgeon et al, 2008; Bickerstaff et al., 2008). Polling conducted in 
the summer of 2011 (Ipsos-Mori, 2011) shows that support for nuclear power had weakened 
post-Fukushima but that it was still, on balance, positive. This helps explain the low level of 
public debate. 68% of people agreed that “Britain needs a mix of energy sources to ensure a 
reliable supply of electricity, including nuclear power and renewable energy sources”. 36% 
supported new build as opposed to 28% who opposed. Another survey (Populus, 2011) 
highlighted the strong gender differences on nuclear power (men being more supportive 
than women), which Fukushima appears to have accentuated. 
Recent UK public opinion on nuclear power has been characterised as “reluctant 
acceptance” (Corner et al., 2011). If nuclear power is characterised as part of a response to 
problems such as climate change, and if it is part of a set of solutions that includes 
renewable energy, then it appears to be acceptable to a majority of the population. 
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Against this background, environmental NGOs, although opposed to nuclear power, have 
not prioritised it as a campaigning issue. Recent Greenpeace campaigns have been directed 
primarily at fossil fuels including preventing the construction of new coal-fired power stations 
without CCS and a “go beyond oil” campaign targeting Arctic drilling for oil (Greenpeace UK, 
no date).  
The attitudes of people in communities that host nuclear power are also vital. Here, support 
appears to be solid (Parkhill et al, 2010). Members of Parliament representing constituencies 
in which nuclear power stations are sited tend to support new build on economic and 
employment grounds (e.g. Bridgwater Mercury, 2009). As any new build will take place at 
existing sites, decisive local opposition is unlikely to emerge.  
What	  difference	  has	  Fukushima	  made?	  
Fukushima appears to have had little direct effect on nuclear prospects in the UK. Public 
debate has been muted, NGOs have been relatively silent and Government promotion of 
nuclear power has continued. The biggest obstacle to new build appears to be the ability of 
developers to make a business case in the context of a poor construction record in other 
parts of Europe (France, Finland) and complex and ambitious Electricity Market Reform 
arrangements. Here, Fukushima has had an indirect effect through the withdrawal of several 
key players (RWE/E.ON/Scottish and Southern/Siemens) from the nuclear arena. The 
prospects for new build in the UK remain credible but are more fragile than they were in 
early 2011. 
The	  UK’s	  response	  in	  the	  international	  arena	  
The UK strongly supports a legally binding international agreement on climate change. This 
position is backed by ambitious commitments at the domestic level. Decarbonisation of the 
electricity sector over the next 20 years will play a central role in delivering this ambition. 
Nuclear power plays a significant role in many electricity decarbonisation scenarios out to 
2030 (e.g. CCC, 2011), although the need for nuclear is disputed (WWF-UK, 2011). The UK 
will continue to take an active role in international climate negotiations, alongside the active 
promotion of nuclear power. 
Germany:	  Green	  energy	  for	  climate	  change	  	  
Patterns	  of	  energy	  supply	  and	  demand	  in	  Germany	  	  
Germany has seen significant changes in its electricity supply over recent years. Due to 
active policies, the renewable share of electricity generation has increased from 5% in 1990 
16 
 
to 25% in the first half of 2012 and is still rapidly increasing. Political targets for 2020 range 
between some 35% in the National Renewable Energy Action Plan (NREAP) and over 50% 
according to the targets of individual Länder (see Lechtenböhmer & Samadi 2012). This 
success has compensated for declining fossil production and stabilised the proportion of 
domestic primary energy demand supplied from indigenous sources at slightly less than 
30% since the late 1990s (AG Energiebilanzen 2011). 
The	  energy	  concept	  2010:	  Low	  carbon	  strategy	  and	  a	  nuclear	  revival	  
Climate policy has been high on the German political agenda since it surfaced in the 
international political arena in the late 1980s. In 1990, the first of a series of parliamentary 
Enquête-Commissions generated important insights into the topic and provided the rationale 
for most of the current climate change targets. Subsequently, scenarios describing a long 
term sustainable and low carbon German energy system were developed (e.g. Wuppertal 
Institut 1995). An Enquête Commission on Sustainable Energy Supply analysed several long 
term low-carbon energy scenarios for Germany which covered the expansion of nuclear, a 
fossil pathway and a renewable pathway (Hennicke 2004).  
Following G8 decisions in Heiligendamm (2007) and with the anticipation of success at the 
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Conference of the Parties in 
Copenhagen in 2009, the international community focused on long term perspectives. 
Various stakeholders in Germany proposed long term low carbon energy scenarios (see 
Lechtenböhmer et al. 2010 for an overview). In line with official policy at the time, which was 
to phase out nuclear, all but one of these scenarios rejected nuclear, but differed in their 
ambition regarding energy efficiency, renewable expansion and the role of fossil fuels.  
Building on this debate the Christian-Democrat/Liberal coalition that took over the Federal 
Government in fall 2009 prepared a new energy concept. This concept envisaged ambitious 
GHG emission reduction targets of 80 to 95% for the period up to 2050 and an increase in 
renewable energy to 80% of electricity production and 60% of total primary energy supply 
(German Government 2010). Its main political purpose, however, was to justify the roll-back 
in nuclear policy that the governing parties had announced. Despite strong public opposition, 
the government pushed its energy concept through Parliament, prolonging the lifetimes of 
existing NPPs by eight to 14 years (BMU, MUKE, 2011, p6). According to a poll conducted 
for the Ministry of Environment 63% of the population were against nuclear lifetime 
expansion and only 25% were in favour. The level of support for nuclear was less than in 
previous polls in 2006 and 2008 (BMU, UBA 2010, 45) 
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A	  political	  tsunami	  triggered	  the	  German	  nuclear	  "U-­‐turn"	  
Against the background of a continuing and highly controversial debate on the lifetime 
extension of NPPs, the catastrophe at the Fukushima NPP resonated in German public 
debate. This forced the government to implement an immediate U-turn on nuclear policy. 
Wittneben (2011) proposed five factors that led to this strong reaction. Most evident among 
these are: a) imminent elections; and b) very intense reporting of nuclear issues in the  
media, which was in turn enhanced by the elections. The others reasons are: c) a feeling of 
close cultural proximity to the Japanese1; d) the history of nuclear resistance; and, probably 
most important, e) an increasing trust in renewable technologies.  
a/b) As the continuing opposition against their very recent lifetime extension was strongly 
intensified by Fukushima, Christian Democrat leaders identified nuclear as a major political 
problem. They feared that it would cost them votes in the coming elections and would, in the 
long term, close the option of going into coalition with the Greens who are strictly anti-
nuclear (Luhmann 2011). As a consequence, only one week after the accident, Chancellor 
Merkel imposed a three month moratorium on operations at eight of the oldest NPPs, 
installed an independent Ethics Commission on the further role of nuclear in Germany and 
asked the Commission on Reactor Safety to check nuclear safety standards. 
d) The existence of a strong anti-nuclear movement in Germany had led to the foundation of 
a Green party in the early 1980s and was strengthened by the 1986 Chernobyl disaster 
(Renn 2011, 3ff). The first red-green Federal Government elected in 1998 made a nuclear 
phase out official policy. In 2000, a phase-out contract with the electricity industry was 
concluded with formal legal regulations following in 2002. The so called "nuclear consensus" 
guaranteed 32 operating years for NPPs before they had to be decommissioned. Although 
by 2010 only two commercial NPPs had been decommissioned, and only one of these had 
been decommissioned as a result of the phase-out policy this laid important foundations for 
the current energy policy (cp. Jahn, Korolczuck 2012). 
                                                
 
 
1 This argument has not been very prominent in the general discussion and is not further 
taken into account here. 
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e) As polls show, Germans never liked nuclear energy but many people were inclined to 
accept the technology as a necessity. General attitudes towards nuclear have changed only 
slightly due to Fukushima. What really has changed in public opinion has been the 
perception that nuclear is no longer needed as there are alternatives.  In 1991, 60% of the 
population believed that nuclear power would be one of the major energy sources of the 
future 30 years ahead while only 26% whished nuclear to be a major source. By 2004 the 
number of people who still believed that nuclear would play a major role had declined by 
more than half to 26% with only 19% being in favour (Allensbach 2004, slide 20f).  This 
change in expectations about the need for nuclear was also the main argument for the 
Ethics Commission2 when it rejected further use of nuclear energy in Germany (Ethics 
Commission for a Safe Energy Supply, 2011). The Commission found that Germany had 
less risky alternatives and should therefore exit from the technology within a decade. 
As a consequence between June and July 2011 several laws on the "Energiewende" 
(energy turnaround) were decided with broad political support. The provisions will lead to the 
final closure of the eight NPPs already taken out of operation and set firm termination dates 
for the licenses of the remaining nine NPPs, the last of which will cease operation by the end 
of 2022 
This more or less takes Germany back to the former phase-out policy adopted by the Red-
Green coalition.  
The political significance of the post-Fukushima decisions is that all the major political 
parties openly support a nuclear phase-out. This sends a clear signal to the electricity 
industry that, unlike previously , there is now no prospect of prolonging nuclear operations.  
                                                
 
 
2 The commission was installed in March 2011 as a consequence to the Fukushima event in 
order to analyse the ethical foundations of nuclear energy in Germany. (For more 
information including teh final report in English see: 
http://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Artikel/2011/05/2011-05-30-bericht-
ethikkommission.html) 
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Blown	  by	  the	  wind:	  Nuclear	  replaced	  by	  renewable	  electricity	  	  
The rapid phase-out decision of March 2011 has raised concerns about Germany's ability to 
secure its electricity supply. However, data shows that Germany was able to compensate for 
nuclear. In 2011, Germany was neither a net importer of electricity nor did it increase its 
domestic fossil electricity generation. In 2011, the shut-down of eight of the 17 NPPs 
reduced electricity generation by about 32 TWh compared to 2010. 60% of the missing 
generation was substituted by increased renewable generation, while decreased net exports 
of electricity accounted for the remainder. However, Germany still had net exports of about 5 
TWh in 2011. Taking into account a slight reduction in domestic electricity demand, 
electricity generation from fossil fuels decreased by some 3 TWh. (AG Energiebilanzen, 
2011a, 2011b; BDEW 2011, Lechtenböhmer & Samadi 2012) 
According to recent projections, Germany has a realistic chance of replacing nuclear 
generation fully with additional renewable energy by 2022, compared to a 2010 baseline. If 
official targets for electricity savings are met, renewables will then account for more than 
50% of German electricity and CO2 emissions could be reduced by more than 50%  
from1990 levels (Lechtenböhmer and Samadi, 2012). 
Renewable	  energies	  for	  international	  climate	  change	  and	  green	  growth	  
Germany has been a strong supporter of international climate policy since the beginning, at 
the EU-level, in the UNFCCC and in the G8. With its energy concept, the German 
government decided on long term national GHG-reduction targets, which would have been 
in line with a strengthening of the EU-target for 2020 to a 30% reduction in emissions 
compared to 1990. The German targets have not been changed, either as a consequence of 
nuclear phase-out-decision or because of the severe problems that have been encountered 
in implementing CCS technology. 
An important reason for this is the success, partly unexpected, of renewable electricity 
production which has also generated a high level of new jobs and income both from 
domestic investment and from the export of technology. A "critical mass" appears to have 
been reached in the sector. 
Against this background, the concept of green-growth has become highly politically relevant. 
From a German perspective, it would be attractive if other countries followed the same path. 
It is believed that this would both help other countries economically and, at the same time, 
generate attractive export opportunities for German technology suppliers. Therefore 
Germany will not only support further ambitious climate policy targets but will also help to 
develop concrete strategies that focus on different forms of technology cooperation and 
20 
 
mitigation action. At the EU level, debate over the extension of the Renewable Energy 
Directive will be important for Germany. With a potential overachievement of national 2020 
targets, Germany is likely to push for ambitious targets beyond 2020. Internationally, there is 
firm German support for the DESERTEC concept which would establish energy 
interconnections between North Africa and Europe. In addition, Germany strongly supports 
the new International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) and the new South African Action 
on Renewables Initiative. Germany also had the ambition of hosting the UN Green Climate 
Fund (German Government, 2011). 
Conclusions	  
The Fukushima accident has triggered far-reaching changes in climate and energy policies 
not only in Japan but in countries on the other side of the world. In this final section, we 
summarise the responses in Japan, the UK and Germany, considering differences and 
commonalities as well as some cross-country lessons.  
Until 2011, all three governments had planned to increase the role of nuclear. The 
Fukushima accident, though it did not affect Germany directly, precipitated a U-turn in 
energy policy. Against a challenging political background, the government shut older nuclear 
plants immediately and enacted plans to close the rest by 2022. Japan shut many nuclear 
plants immediately, facing consequent power shortages, but took far longer to announce a 
nuclear phase-out, albeit one that will be much slower than in Germany with the last plant 
coming off-line in 2039 according to current plans. Following a pre-emptive review of safety 
regulation and a relatively low level of public concern (“it couldn’t happen here”), the UK is 
continuing with plans for nuclear new build. Any question-marks about future developments 
relate to market conditions and the financial framework for nuclear power which are, at best, 
affected indirectly by the Fukushima accident. In September 2012, A business deal that links 
all three countries was concluded when Hitachi, whose future role in the Japanese nuclear 
sector has been blocked, bought the interest of two German utilities, RWE and E.ON in 
Horizon Power which is planning nuclear new build in the UK. 
Germany has reinforced its ambitions for renewable energy, building on its existing success 
in transforming its electricity system. This will directly affect Germany’s neighbours. The UK 
had already planned to scale up renewable energy starting from a very low base although, 
unlike in Germany, there is no plan for renewables to dominate electricity generation. The 
view in UK policy-making circles has been that nuclear would be “reluctantly accepted” by 
the public as a long as it was part of a package that included parallel support for renewables. 
The situation in Japan is far less clear. Traditional resistance to renewables among 
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established interests in the electricity sector and government is now balanced by a wider 
interest across society. The ensuing tensions have yet to be resolved.  
Table 1 presents, at a very high level, a number of indicators which suggest reasons for the 
very different positions the three countries have taken. 
Table 1: Indicators of propensity to support/reject nuclear power 
 Japan Germany UK 
Climate change policy  H M H 
Energy security needs H M L 
Market liberalisation L M H 
Interconnected electricity system L H L 
Independence of regulatory scrutiny L H H 
Sensitivity to nuclear accidents, weapons siting 
etc.  
H H L 
Nuclear weapons capability N N Y 
Existence of plans for nuclear phase-out Y Y N 
Strength of anti-nuclear movement L H M 
Perceived availability of alternatives L H L 
Notes: Y = yes; N = no; H = high; M = medium; L = low 
Source: subjective view of the authors 
Germany and Japan have decided to phase out nuclear power: the UK has not. The 
underlying reason appears to be a lower level of anxiety about nuclear risks in the UK which 
is the only nuclear weapons state and where there appears to be public confidence in 
regulatory institutions.  In addition, there appears to be a broad belief that events such as 
the 2011 tsunami are inconceivable given the UK’s geography. Environmental NGOs have 
not prioritised opposition to nuclear new build and any obstacles appear to be in the 
commercial rather than the public acceptability domain.  
The difference between Germany and Japan lies in the speed and decisiveness of the 
response. In spite of the fact that the tsunami occurred thousands of miles away, Germany 
was the first to propose a nuclear phase-out within 10 years, while Japan took much longer 
to agree a phase-out which will take 25-30 years. Germany could act quickly because of the 
extent of prior policy effort on the alternatives, notably renewable energy for which ambitious 
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targets already existed. In addition, Germany is firmly embedded in the wider European 
electricity market and could re-balance domestic production, imports and exports to 
compensate for nuclear plants going off-line. 
Although it was Japan that was directly affected by the Fukushima, the country’s dilemma 
was more acute. Plant shutdowns have stimulated the need for voluntary reductions in 
electricity demand; imports of natural gas have risen to help compensate for lost nuclear 
output; and already challenging climate change targets have been dropped. Although 
Japan’s response has necessarily been slower in terms of energy policy change, the 
changes run far deeper and are of perhaps historical significance. Electricity markets 
arrangements are being revised; regulatory powers have been transferred to remove 
conflicts of interest; and the balance of ambition for nuclear and renewable energy has been 
fundamentally altered. The events and the response may have changed forever the 
Japanese public’s relationship with technical elites.  
The impacts on international climate policy are less clear. The German and UK governments 
continue to support ambitious international climate policies as part of a broader European 
effort. If anything, the German position may become stronger as it seeks to export the new 
renewables solutions proposed as part of its energy policy U-turn. On the other hand, there 
is an emerging policy debate in the UK about the perceived cost of renewable energy and its 
impact on energy bills. The government has not so far changed policy although the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer has flagged concerns about impacts on UK competitiveness. 
Japan had already announced that it would not support the continuation of the Kyoto 
Protocol even before the Fukushima accident. The Japanese government will be reluctant to 
change this position on the grounds of policy consistency. However environmental NGOs 
are demanding a change of the negotiating position on the grounds that Japan will not be 
significantly disadvantaged following the Durban agreement in which all major economies 
will commit to some GHG emission reductions in the near future. Longer term Japanese 
policy is deeply uncertain as fears about climate change have been replaced by more 
immediate concerns following the tsunami and Fukushima accident.  
The case studies demonstrate that trust and local agreement are crucial for low carbon 
electricity. Well-designed institutional arrangements for regulating energy technologies and 
markets appear to be critical. The lack of separation of responsibilities for promoting and 
regulating nuclear power was a fundamental institutional weakness in Japan, now 
recognised by the Japanese government. This may not only have contributed to the severity 
of the Fukushima accident through compromised safety standards, it may have further 
undermined public trust in Japan’s energy companies and institutions. In the UK, the 
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capacity to commission a rapid, independent review of safety arrangements helped to 
prevent a decisive shift in public opinion away from nuclear. 
The question of trust extends more widely. In the UK, nuclear had been promoted by the 
government as part of the solution to climate change alongside renewable energy. The 
“nuclear and renewables” policy message, rather than “nuclear versus renewables”, appears 
to have generated acceptance of the general policy thrust. Trust is also important at the local 
level. In the UK, local communities, accustomed to living alongside nuclear plants, have 
supported new build at existing sites. There has been no attempt to develop nuclear power 
at greenfield sites. In Japan local resistance is the reason why nuclear power plants shut 
down for inspection are currently not being reconnected to the grid. 
Local considerations and sensitivities to energy investments are critical. Germany could 
require considerable investment in electricity transmission capacity to further its renewable 
ambitions. The German regulator has already expressed concern about whether this 
investment can be made in a timely way given possible resistance from local communities. 
In the UK, there has been considerable resistance to onshore wind at certain sites, driving 
utilities to make more expensive offshore investments. 
Finally, both Germany and Japan have demonstrated the capacity to turn round energy 
policy very quickly. Both have coped, although with some distress in Japan, with the loss of 
considerable volumes of electricity generation output. In Japan, “business-as-usual” in terms 
of electricity consumption was not an option. Here, the possibility of saving significant 
amounts of energy very quickly in an emergency has been demonstrated. It is unlikely that 
these patterns of consumption will be sustained but there are lessons to be learned about 
the possibility of decoupling economic activity, energy use and CO2 emissions.  
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